The Security Policies of Arrau: Striking Hard on Crime While Shielding Financial Secrets

Original article: La seguridad de Arrau: Mano dura abajo, secreto bancario arriba

By Leopoldo Lavín Mujica

The Kast Government has positioned the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime as the cornerstone of its security narrative.

However, while the far-right pushes for a constitutional reform that significantly expands state powers, it remains resistant to a crucial tool for combating criminal organizations: lifting banking secrecy and tracing the flow of illicit funds.

Defeating drug trafficking requires more than just police, military, prisons, or states of emergency; it also necessitates understanding who receives, moves, launders, and protects ill-gotten gains.

The reform advocated by Security Minister Martín Arrau proposes modifications to between 10 and 12 articles of the Constitution and is part of a broader package of approximately 35 legislative measures.

Among these measures are a registry of criminal and terrorist organizations, a new «crime of membership,» differentiated penitentiary regimes, extreme isolation, preventive asset seizure, a fifth state of emergency, and the ability to intercept communications without prior judicial authorization. This represents a profound shift in the relationship between security, the state, and citizens’ rights.

The concern is not that the state pursues organized crime—no one would oppose dismantling criminal gangs, seizing their assets, or preventing their territorial control. The issue arises when the penal response begins to focus less on proven conduct and more on administrative definitions of people, organizations, and territories.

The «crime of membership» is particularly alarming: turning active membership in a pre-registered organization into an autonomous crime drastically changes the traditional requirements for criminal responsibility. Even more concerning is the push to constitutionally protect certain measures against challenges of arbitrariness.

If a Constitution preemptively states that certain penitentiary regimes «shall never be deemed arbitrary,» it risks transforming the Constitution into a tool that limits its own mechanisms for constitutional oversight.

History shows that exceptional powers, once incorporated into law, seldom remain confined to their original purposes.

The new «state of emergency for public security» takes this logic further, potentially applying to specific neighborhoods or «polygons,» with military participation under police command and the ability to intercept communications without prior judicial approval.

Legal experts have already raised concerns about the risk of exceptional measures becoming normalized. Furthermore, there are restrictions on social benefits for individuals convicted of drug trafficking or terrorism.

The inevitable public question is: How far can the state go in the name of security without transforming security into a euphemism for the suspension of rights?

However, a more pressing question arises: Why does the hardline approach seem to focus on targeting individuals and territories, while the financial pathways of crime remain a politically sensitive area?

To genuinely combat drug trafficking, it is essential to identify its accounts, front men, companies, transfers, and laundering mechanisms. Money serves as the lifeblood of criminal organizations. Without tracking, seizing, and reaching those who manage it, criminal prosecution risks being confined to the weakest links of the chain.

This brings to light another significant gap: the entrenched corruption within power networks cannot be overlooked in this battle against organized crime. The Hermosilla case demonstrated how lawyers, businessmen, authorities, and operators with privileged access could influence issues that compromised the justice system.

Investigations into the actions of Hermosilla and Andrés Chadwick to favor judicial appointments, as well as the background of the so-called Zaliasnik case, reveal that the influence peddling extends beyond the neighborhood’s criminal underworld.

The case of the so-called «Belarusian Doll» once again highlights this dimension of the problem: investigations over alleged bribery, money laundering, and dealings associated with significant economic interests show that networks of corruption can operate where there is power, money, and privileged access to institutions.

If the new security policy does not address these networks, the fight against crime will inevitably be selective—harsh measures against petty offenses while exercising excessive caution towards power circuits.

The true battle against drug trafficking should begin by following the money trail without political, economic, or social exceptions. It must target the dealer, the front man, the money launderer, the official who facilitates, the lawyer who traffics influence, and the judge who potentially uses their position to favor private interests.

Otherwise, Arrau’s reform may lead to the establishment of a state with vast capabilities for surveillance, interception, punishment, and rights restriction, but lacking the same resolve to investigate where the money is and who possesses the power to protect it.

Leopoldo Lavín Mujica