British Financial Strategies to Eject Spain from Latin America

An investigative report on the payments, trading houses, and networks that turned independence into a British business.

British Financial Strategies to Eject Spain from Latin America

Original article: El dinero de Inglaterra para expulsar a España de Latinoamérica


Traditional historiography has depicted Latin American independence as a national liberation movement. However, British archives reveal a parallel story: a geopolitical operation funded from London, executed through trading houses and undercover agents, designed to wrest Spain’s American empire and turn it into a captive market for the pound sterling.

This was not charity; it was a calculated investment.

By Bruno Sommer

Francisco de Miranda: The Agent Funded by the British Crown

The case of Francisco de Miranda is the most documented. Starting in October 1801, the British government granted him a personal pension of £500 per year, which was later increased to £700, plus an additional £200 for his secretary, Mr. Molini. This pension was not intended for financing expeditions but for his personal sustenance and that of his household in London, where the headquarters of the independence conspiracy operated.

The documentation is explicit. In September 1810, Miranda wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Wellesley requesting the government to «continue the payment of the £700 annual pension for himself and £200 for his secretary.» The response was favorable.

But the pension was only the tip of the iceberg. The trading house Turnbull & Forbes, based in London, was the vehicle through which operational funds flowed. A handwritten statement by Miranda reveals the nature of the operation:

«I hereby declare that the amount of the enclosed bill was advanced to me by Messrs. Turnbull, Forbes and Co. to assist me and others connected with me in our efforts to bring Freedom and independence to Spanish America… and that their action was largely induced by the favorable reception I received from Mr. Pitt upon my arrival in this country in 1798.»

The amounts are significant. A statement from Turnbull & Forbes sent to the English government shows that, between May 1801 and July 1802, the firm disbursed over £21,000 to cover expenses arising from Miranda’s activities. In 1806, when Miranda planned his invasion of Venezuela, he obtained £6,000 in bills of exchange through Turnbull & Forbes, in addition to £2,000 in cash.

Miranda himself acknowledges that Turnbull & Forbes acted prompted by the backing of Prime Minister William Pitt. They were not an independent commercial partner but the financial arm of an operation tolerated and encouraged by the authorities.

Simón Bolívar: The Weapons Bought by López Méndez’s Network

Unlike Miranda, Simón Bolívar did not receive direct payments from the British government. Recent academic research is clear on this point: «the failure to obtain official support from the British government for independence was compensated by the development of a network of individuals and private associations that supplied large quantities of arms, equipment, and men.»

The instrument of this network was Luis López Méndez, Venezuela’s representative in London. In March 1817, Bolívar sent him a document—known as «the Powers»—that empowered him to sign contracts on behalf of the Republic. There was no money. However, three months later, López Méndez had already organized the departure of the first ship with arms, equipment, and British volunteers.

The flow of military assistance continued for two years, until 1819. Nearly fifty thousand rifles and muskets, hundreds of tons of ammunition and gunpowder, artillery, lances, machetes, swords, sabers, and pistols were sold to the republicans. All was supplied by private companies, while the British government maintained its officially neutral policy.

Research by Matthew Brown, Joanna Crow, and Jonathan Lea (University of Bristol, 2024) concludes that «all foreign military aid was supplied by private companies» and that López Méndez’s network was crucial in sustaining the war.

José de San Martín: The Army Funded from London

The case of José de San Martín is perhaps the most controversial. Various authors argue that San Martín «followed British guidelines at all times, was financed by England, supervised, controlled, and instructed by British officials.»

The most concrete data is the loan of £1,200,000 at thirty years arranged to finance the liberating expedition to Peru. The banker Tomás Kinder imposed a 25% discount, and Peru drew against a £700,000 account managed from London by San Martín’s own envoys.

The British plan, according to San Martín’s diary, included an army of over 8,000 mercenaries and the corresponding logistics. The funds, according to these sources, «came from Great Britain to destabilize and finance mercenaries without end.»

However, there is a historiographical debate. Some authors argue that San Martín built the Army of the Andes from Cuyo, with Mendoza as a strategic center, relying on contributions, taxes, and local production. What is not disputed is that the network of British agents—James Paroissien, Juan García del Río, Captain Peter Heywood—was fundamental for the logistics and funding of the campaign.

British Trading Houses in Chile: The Independence Business

The Loan from Hullett Brothers (1822)

The first Chilean loan was contracted in May 1822 with the house Hullett Brothers & Company of London for one million pounds sterling, with an annual interest rate of 6% and 1% amortization. The operation was negotiated by Antonio José de Irisarri, envoy of Bernardo O’Higgins.

The conditions were onerous. The bonds were placed at 67.5% of their nominal value, resulting in a net product of only £664,652. The bankers retained £15,000 for the first amortization. Irisarri collected $100,000 for commission** and **$90,000 in owed salaries.

The contract secured the revenues of the Mint, the Territorial Tax, and the Tithes. Chile mortgaged its fiscal sovereignty to finance the war. The loan was misallocated: $1,500,000 was lent to Peru (not repaid until 1848), back salaries were paid, and military expeditions were financed.

The Gibbs House: The Nitrate Empire

The Gibbs House (Antony Gibbs & Sons) was established in London in 1808 and arrived in Valparaíso in 1826, although it had already been operating in the region earlier. It became one of the most powerful British firms on the west coast of South America. Its business span extended from Valparaíso and Santiago to all the mining districts in the north and the main agricultural areas in the south.

By the mid-19th century, British trading houses such as Gibbs & Sons took control of national foreign trade. They controlled the exports of copper and silver to Europe and the imports of manufactured goods. The Gibbs House was a key player in the Peruvian nitrate monopoly and in the trade of nitrate, the strategic resource that triggered the War of the Pacific (1879).

The Edwards Family: Power in the Shadows

The Edwards family was another pillar of British dependence. George Edwards Brown, an English sailor who arrived in Chile in 1804, financed the first Chilean navy and the liberating expedition to Peru. His son, Agustín Edwards Ossandón, founded in 1867 the Bank of A. Edwards, the first private financial institution in Chile.

From Valparaíso, the Edwards family wove a network that spanned banking, mining, agriculture, and the press. Their power was such that a senator accused President Arturo Alessandri of being an «agent of the Pool«, meaning, of the interests of The Gibbs House. The family not only amassed wealth but also controlled the discourse through El Mercurio de Valparaíso, the country’s most influential newspaper, shaping public opinion for over a century.

Other Trading Houses

The British consortium that controlled the Chilean economy after independence also included Huth & Co. (established in Valparaíso in 1824), Duncan, Fox & Co., Graham, Rowe & Co., Williamson Balfour & Co. and Weir, Scott & Co., which dominated foreign trade, banking, and insurance. The pioneers—James Powditch, O. Bunster, Andrew Blest, John Callon, William Taylor and William Forbes—were operating in Valparaíso as early as 1819, laying the groundwork for the British mercantile colony.

By Bruno Sommer

Founder of El Ciudadano

  • Archive of the National Academy of History (Argentina), documents on Miranda and Turnbull & Forbes.
  • Brown, M., Crow, J., & Lea, J. (2024). «Financing a Revolution: The Impact of Bolívar’s British Networks in the Independence of Colombia», Journal of Latin American Studies, Cambridge University Press.
  • Calabrese, A. José de San Martín… Was He an English Agent? (cited in La Nación).
  • Documents from the United Grand Lodge of England (response from James William Stubbs, 1979).
  • Chilean National Library, History of External Debt.
  • Rojas Flores, G. (2019). «The Gibbs & Co. Trading House and Its Investments in Chile», History.
  • Terragno, R. San Martín’s Diary.

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