Santiago Civil Court Rejects Statute of Limitations, Orders State to Pay CLP 50,000,000 to Torture and Sexual Violence Survivor

Santiago’s Sixteenth Civil Court ordered the Chilean Treasury to pay 50,000,000 Chilean pesos in moral damages to C.L.M.T., who was illegally detained, tortured, and subjected to sexual violence in the first months of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 1973.

In its decision, Judge Susana Ortiz Valenzuela rejected the State’s defenses of lack of standing, full reparation, and, crucially, the statute of limitations, after finding the plaintiff was the victim of crimes against humanity—imprescriptible in both criminal and civil venues.

Victim of torture and sexual violence

The ruling recounts the ordeal endured by C.L.M.T. beginning on September 25, 1973. According to the record, she was arrested by Carabineros officers and taken to the Vallenar police station, where she was held incommunicado until October 3, 1973. She was then transferred to Vallenar Prison, where the court found she was interrogated under torture and subjected to sexual violence.

Her detention continued on October 20, 1973 at the Regimiento Arica in La Serena and, the following day, at the women’s prison ‘Buen Pastor’ in the same city, where she remained until May 20, 1974. Her confinement concluded with relegation to the city of Concepción. The plaintiff has official recognition as a victim of political imprisonment and torture under the Valech I Commission report.

The lawsuit was filed by attorneys N.A:L.S. and E.A.G.R. on behalf of C.L.M.T. and her daughter, who also sought damages for indirect suffering.

As a defense, the Treasury raised the exceptions of lack of active standing, integral reparation, and—above all—time-bar, arguing that because this is a civil claim for compensation, the Civil Code’s limitation periods should apply.

The court dismissed all of those objections, holding that the conduct at issue constitutes crimes against humanity.

No statute of limitations and human dignity

In her ruling, Judge Ortiz cited both the United Nations Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights to support the decision.

“It is necessary to determine whether the prerequisites are met for awarding the requested damages and to establish the State’s responsibility for the victim’s detention outside any legal process by State agents, in light of the applicable rules,” she wrote.

She noted that the United Nations Charter lists among its purposes and principles the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all—an objective repeatedly reinforced in subsequent international treaties.

Regarding the American Convention, the ruling points to Articles 1.1 and 63.1, which provide that when human rights have been violated, the offending State is obligated to repair the harm by paying fair compensation to the injured party.

“Under the Convention’s second paragraph, the human rights secured by a treaty are incorporated into the domestic legal order, and no State organ may disregard them. That obligation also derives from international instruments such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” the court added.

By classifying the acts of torture and sexual violence as crimes against humanity, the court applied the doctrine of imprescriptibility, following Supreme Court precedent that has recognized civil actions arising from crimes against humanity as not subject to limitation.

Compensation and moral damages

On the amount, the court acknowledged the inherent difficulty of quantifying pain and suffering but set the payment prudently:

“In determining the quantum of compensation, the moral damages suffered by the plaintiff, C.L.M.T., are established for the reasons stated. Although this type of harm is complex to calculate and quantify, it is prudently set at 50,000,000 Chilean pesos in favor of C.L.M.T.,” the Sixteenth Civil Court of Santiago ruled.

The judgment also orders that the sum be adjusted according to variations in the Consumer Price Index from the date of the ruling until the month prior to actual payment, and that statutory interest accrue from the date the decision becomes final.

 See the First-Instance ruling